Cyber a acks have become serious threats to Industrial Control systems as well. It becomes important to develop a serious threat defense system against such vulnerabilities. For such process control systems, safety should also be assured apart from security. As unearthing vulnerabilities and patching them is not a feasible solution, these critical infrastructures need safeguards to prevent accidents, both natural and arti cial, that could potentially be hazardous. Morita proposed an e ective Zone division [3] , capable of evaluating remote and concealed a acks on the system, coupled with Principal Component Analysis. But the need to analyze the node that has been compromised and stopping any further damages, requires an automated technique. Illustrating the basic ideas we'll simulate a simple Water plant. We propose a new automated approach based on Long Short Term Memory networks capable of detecting a acks and pin point the location of the breach.
INTRODUCTION
In the age of Internet, cyber a acks have become a major threat. Until recently only private and information centered systems were breached. But now, cyber a acks are a threat to Industrial Systems as Well. Serious security vulnerabilities are patched in regular personal computers and commercial spaces, quite frequently but Industrial control systems are seldom xed as these patches could lead to new con icts in the system. is opens up a wide space for a ackers to sneak in. A prime example would be of Stuxnet, that sabotaged Iranian uranium enrichment facilities in 2010.
e Stuxnet malware
Stuxnet utilized existing vulnerabilities in the operating system, along with a good understanding of the PLCs to formulate a malware. e sole target of the malware was to manipulate the working of centrifuges that enriched Uranium. Such carefully cra ed a acks cannot be prevented unless a perfect system is built. Instead, it is enough to detect such breaches and then assess the damage. us it is important to build a reliable security and safety mechanism to prevent against a acks like Stuxnet.
Zone Based PCA
Hashimoto proposed a method of securing the information system by dividing the network into "plural zones". By Zone Division
[1] the probability of detecting possible a acks and accidents is increased. Conjoined with PCA [3] , Zone Based PCA can analyze the relationship between the variables in plural zones and detect any changes caused by potential concealed breaches and unintended accidents. ere can many types of relationships between the variables that are analyzed di erently by Zone-Based PCA. An on-board safety personnel is still required, who may notice the change in PCA variables and report an anomaly.
Sequence Learning
We propose a new approach based on sequence learning algorithms, to detect changes from regular working unlike relationships between variables. e neural network architecture, utilized is capable of learning how the normal functioning of the system looks like and detect if something has changed.
In order to illustrate the working of the system, we simulate a simple water plant, that circulates hot water between two tanks.
SIMULATED SYSTEM
e simulation is a very basic version of the plant. In this system (Figure 1 ), water circulates between two tanks (Tank1 and Tank2) .
e systems contain SCADA and other operators. e plant consists of many sensors and controls ( Figure 2 ). 
Variables in the System
L1 and L2 are levels of water in Tank1 and Tank2 respectively. Similarly, T1 and T2 measure the temperatures.
e Heater (H) provides heat to increase the temperature of water in Tank2. e Pump (P) pumps the heated water into Tank1. Valves V1 and V2 are controlled to allow water to ow across them. Tank1 is assumed to radiate heat and cool down the water.
We de ne two kinds of variables in our system. Process variables are the ones that are measured by sensors. Control Variables can be manipulated and change the state of the plant.
Process Variables: L1, L2, T1, T2, F1, F2, F3 Control Variables: V1, V2, H, P
Network Con guration of the System
e network is divided into two control zones, such that the control of a control variable that directly a ects a process variable is in a di erent zone.
Zone 1: L1, T1, V2, F2, H Zone 2: L2, T2, V1, F1, F3, P A control variable in a zone cannot directly a ect process variables in the same zone. In the current setup, L1 depends directly on the ow F1 controlled by V1. erefore they are being separated.
e rest of the division can be explained by similar logic fashion. H decides the amount of heat delivered into the system. ere by it controls both T1 and T2, yet it is clubbed with T1 in Zone1 as there is more direct dependency between H and T2 as compared to H and T1. A formal method based on decidability matrices was presented by Hashimoto [1] e order of variance is as follows; blue, green, red in decreasing order. e periodic nature of the plot is due to the way water is circulated. Now we'll simulate a data injection a ack with concealment. e a ack manipulates Zone 2 and takes over the control of variables V1 and P. By se ing them both to 0, the water in Tank1 doesn't decrease and the temperature of Tank1 increase to the extent where it depressurizes. ere is drastic change in the behavior of the projection in blue. Any on-board personnel can realize such a change of high magnitude and shut down the systems if necessary.
It becomes di cult with increasing types of manipulation to identify what kind of change in the systems produces a particular kind of behavior in the PCA projection.
ZONE BASED LSTM NETWORK
e PCA method evaluates relationships between variables and raises alarm when the relationships or the dependencies between the variables changes. e relationships can change in many di erent ways when the number of variables involved is very large.
Instead of understanding the dependency between them, we focus on di erentiating the modes of running of the plant as a whole. A normal working state is very di erent from a compromised state. As the systems tend to repetitive work, it is not hard to notice that there is a pa ern to the way an un-compromised plant produces data.
In order to achieve this, we use sequence learning LSTM networks in our method. LSTM achieves this by what are termed as memory control gates in the unit. ere are di erent gates to control and lter data. e gates decide what kind of variables at a simulation point are important. By doing so repeatedly, it learns the values of the variables to look for to understand the sequence pa ern. It then assigns a score , that signi es how strongly it believes in the pa ern.
Long Short Term Memory
We train an LSTM network with a logged data of the normal functioning of plant, and use it to give a con dence score to the previous 50 points at every evaluation point.
is enables us to know if the current sequence of data generated is in high correlation with data generated during normal functioning. Normal functioning ensures a score match near close to 1, which is expected.
In Figure 7 we compromise zone2 in a similar fashion. Both P and V1 are set to 0 here. It is to be noted that when the zone is compromised, the running of the plant produces a di erent pa ern of data. en the LSTM network gives us a correlation score with the actual pa ern of functioning, which in this case, when P is set to 0 averages around a value of 0.85.
When the variable P is set to 1 (Figure 8 ), the pa ern of execution produces scores averaging around 0.8.
By thresholding at di erent values we can easily identify which variable the a acker has modi ed. We can also detect the zone which has been compromised. A plausible set of thresholds to detect the variable could be. P = 0: score ∈ (0.8, 0.9) P = 1: score ∈ (0.75, 0.85)
CONCLUSION
A ack Detection is of paramount importance as opposed to unearthing vulnerabilities and xing them, in Industrial Systems due to high latency in patching their systems. e proposed method for intrusion detection, based on LSTM is also capable of diagnosing the a ack for points of failure. Sequence-based learning and anomaly detection have an advantage over PCA-based methods in this regard. is approach shows an example of interdisciplinary work on implementing machine learning technologies for tackling the problems of Industrial Systems and Networks.
